According to the plan I laid out in my first paper, two subjects still remain: how the proposed government resembles your own State constitution, and the added security its adoption would give to republican government, to liberty, and to property. But the work so far has already covered both so thoroughly that anything I added now would only restate, at greater length, what has already been said; and the late stage of the debate, together with the time already spent on it, forbids that.
OriginalACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to your own State constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is striking that the convention’s plan resembles New York’s own constitution not only in its real merits but in many of its supposed faults. Among the alleged defects are these: the President’s eligibility for re-election, the lack of a council, the absence of a formal bill of rights, and the omission of any clause securing the liberty of the press. These objections, and several others raised in the course of our inquiries, apply just as much to this State’s existing constitution as to the one proposed for the Union. A man has slender claim to consistency who rails at the new plan for imperfections he readily excuses in his own State’s charter.
Indeed, there is no clearer proof of the insincerity of some zealous opponents among us, men who profess to admire the very government they live under, than the fury with which they have attacked the convention’s plan on points where our own constitution is equally, or perhaps more, vulnerable.
OriginalIt is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.
The added security to republican government, to liberty, and to property comes chiefly from several sources. Preserving the Union will restrain local factions and insurrections, and check the ambition of powerful men within single States, who might otherwise, through leaders and favorites, gain enough credit and influence to become the people’s despots. Union will narrow the openings for foreign intrigue that the Confederacy’s dissolution would invite; it will prevent the extensive military establishments that wars between disunited States would inevitably produce; it guarantees each State a republican form of government; and it absolutely and universally excludes titles of nobility. It also guards against a repetition of those State practices that have undermined property and credit, sown mutual distrust among all classes of citizens, and brought morals to near-universal ruin.
OriginalThe additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State governments which have undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.
Thus, fellow-citizens, I have completed the task I set myself; what success it has had, your conduct must decide. I trust you will at least grant that I have kept the promise I gave about the spirit of these endeavors. I have addressed myself purely to your judgment, and have carefully avoided the bitterness that so often disgraces political disputants of every party, bitterness that the opponents of the Constitution did much to provoke.
OriginalThus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution.
The charge that the plan’s advocates have conspired against the people’s liberties is too wanton and too malicious not to rouse the indignation of any man who feels its falsehood in his own breast. The endless harping on the wealthy, the well-born, and the great has disgusted every sensible man, and the concealments and misrepresentations used in various ways to keep the truth from the public deserve the condemnation of every honest one. It may be that these circumstances betrayed me at times into sharper expressions than I intended; I have certainly felt a frequent struggle between feeling and restraint, and if feeling sometimes prevailed, my excuse is that it did so neither often nor by much.
OriginalThe charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, over the course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has been satisfactorily cleared of the slanders thrown at it, and shown to deserve the public’s approval and to be necessary to its safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself, by the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act on the sober dictates of his judgment. No motive can excuse him from this duty; all the obligations that bind society together call on him to discharge it sincerely. No partial motive, no private interest, no pride of opinion, no passing passion or prejudice can justify, to himself, his country, or his posterity, a wrong choice of the part he must play. Let him beware of stubborn loyalty to party; let him reflect that what he decides is not some particular interest of the community but the very existence of the nation; and let him remember that a majority of America has already endorsed the plan he is to approve or reject.
OriginalLet us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I will not pretend otherwise: I feel complete confidence in the arguments that recommend this system to you, and I can see no real force in those raised against it. I am persuaded that it is the best our political situation, habits, and opinions will allow, and superior to anything the revolution has produced.
OriginalI shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced.
The plan’s friends have conceded that it falls short of perfection, and its enemies have made much of the admission. “Why,” they ask, “should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is fixed beyond recall?” This sounds plausible, but it is only plausible. First, the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been cast as an admission that the plan is fundamentally defective, and that without major changes the community’s rights and interests cannot safely be trusted to it. So far as I understand those who make the concessions, this entirely twists their meaning. No advocate of the measure can be found who will not declare it his view that the system, though imperfect in some parts, is on the whole a good one; the best the country’s present views and circumstances permit; and one that promises every kind of security a reasonable people could want.
OriginalConcessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people can desire.
I answer next that it would be the height of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and to expose the Union to the hazard of one experiment after another, in the fanciful pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. Whatever any collective body produces must be a mixture: of the errors and prejudices, as well as the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals who compose it. A compact meant to bind thirteen distinct States in a common union must likewise be a compromise among that many different interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such materials?
OriginalI answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such materials?
The reasons given in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this city are unanswerable in showing how unlikely it is that a new convention could be assembled under circumstances anywhere near as favorable to a good outcome as those in which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat its arguments, since I assume the pamphlet has circulated widely; it is certainly worth every patriot’s reading. There is, however, one further angle on the subject of amendments that has not yet been set before the public, and I cannot bring myself to conclude without first surveying it.
OriginalThe reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this city,(1) are unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this aspect.
It seems to me capable of absolute proof that later amendments to the Constitution will be far easier to obtain than prior ones. The moment any alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, for purposes of adoption, a new plan, and must be decided afresh by each State. To establish it fully throughout the Union would therefore require the agreement of all thirteen States. If, instead, the Constitution as it stands were once ratified by all the States, alterations could thereafter be made by nine. The odds, then, run thirteen to nine in favor of amending afterward rather than adopting an entire system at the outset.
OriginalIt appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine(2) in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.
Nor is that all. Any Constitution for the United States must consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States must be accommodated in their interests or their views of interest. We may therefore expect that any body framing it from scratch will divide differently on different points: many who form a majority on one question become the minority on a second, and a still different grouping forms the majority on a third. Hence the need to mould and arrange every particular so as to satisfy all the parties to the compact, and hence an immense multiplication of difficulties in obtaining their collective assent to a final act, a multiplication that grows with the number of particulars and the number of parties.
OriginalThis is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation, very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, once it is established, would be a single proposition, brought forward on its own. There would be no need for management or compromise on any other point, no giving and taking. The will of the required number would at once settle the matter. Whenever nine, or rather ten, States united in wanting a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There is therefore no comparison between the ease of making an amendment and that of establishing a complete Constitution in the first instance.
OriginalBut every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other point--no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
Against the likelihood of later amendments, it has been urged that those entrusted with running the national government will always be loath to give up any of the power they hold. For my part, I am thoroughly convinced that any amendments later judged useful will bear on the government’s structure, not on the mass of its powers; on that ground alone the objection carries no weight. I also think it weak on another ground: the sheer difficulty of governing thirteen States, even apart from any ordinary measure of public spirit and integrity, will constantly force the national rulers into a spirit of accommodation toward their constituents’ reasonable expectations.
OriginalIn opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their constituents.
But there is a further consideration that proves the objection futile beyond doubt: whenever nine States concur, the national rulers will have no choice in the matter. Under the fifth article of the plan, Congress is obliged, “on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount to nine), to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.” The words are peremptory: Congress “shall call a convention.” Nothing here is left to its discretion, and so all the declamation about an unwillingness to change vanishes into air. Hard as it may be to unite two thirds or three fourths of the legislatures on amendments that touch local interests, there is no reason to fear such difficulty when the points concern only the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the inclination of the State legislatures to raise barriers against encroachments by the national authority.
OriginalBut there is yet a further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount to nine), to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If this argument is a fallacy, then I am certainly deceived by it myself, for in my view it is one of those rare cases in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical proof. Those who see the matter as I do, however eager they may be for amendments, must agree that prior adoption is the surest road to their own object.
OriginalIf the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal to amend before the Constitution is established ought to cool in every man ready to accept the truth of these observations from a writer at once solid and ingenious: “To balance a large state or society,” he says, “whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments.” These judicious reflections, drawn from Hume’s essay on the rise of arts and sciences, hold a lesson of moderation for every sincere lover of the Union. They ought to put such men on guard against risking anarchy, civil war, a lasting estrangement of the States from one another, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, all in pursuit of what they are unlikely to win except through time and experience.
OriginalThe zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and ingenious: "To balance a large state or society (says he), whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor; TIME must bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments."(3) These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and EXPERIENCE.
It may be a defect of political courage in me, but I confess I cannot share the calm of those who pretend the dangers of remaining longer in our present situation are imaginary. A nation without a national government is, to my eyes, an awful spectacle. To establish a Constitution in a time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, and I look toward its completion with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it with no rule of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, on seven of the thirteen States, and, after covering so much of the ground, to begin the course again. I dread the consequences of fresh attempts all the more because I know that powerful men, in this and other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possible form.
OriginalIt may be in me a defect of political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION, without a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possible shape. PUBLIUS 1. Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New York." 2. It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three fourths must ratify. 3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I, p. 128: "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."
