The Conformity of the Constitutional Plan to Republican Principles
by James Madison
Federalist 39
The final paper finished the observations which were designed to start a honest examination of the government plan reported by the convention. Now we move on to complete that part of our task.
OriginalTHE last paper having concluded the observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that part of our undertaking.
The first thing to ask is: is the proposed government genuinely republican? It is clear that only a republican form of government would be compatible with the American ethos, as these principles fueled the revolution, and because a republican government is consistent with the belief in the ability of people to govern themselves—a belief held by all who value freedom. If the plan of the convention is not a republic, then it cannot be defended and must be abandoned.
OriginalThe first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.
What then are the features of a republic? If we rely on how the term has been used to describe various states, rather than sticking to its principles, we would never arrive at a clear definition. In Holland, the term “republic” is used despite the government not being derived from the people. Venice is another example where the term “republic” is used inaccurately, as the government is controlled by a small group of hereditary nobles. Poland is yet another example where the term “republic” is misapplied, given its mix of aristocracy and monarchy. England is a case where the term “republic” is used despite having a mixed government that includes a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy. These varied examples demonstrate the lack of precision in the use of the term “republic” in political discussions.
OriginalWhat, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers, to the constitution of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified with the same appellation. The government of England, which has one republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.
A republic should be defined as a government that derives its powers from the people and is administered by officials who serve for limited terms or based on good conduct. For a government to be a true republic, it must represent the broad society, not just a privileged class, to avoid becoming a tyranny under the guise of a republic. As long as officials are appointed directly or indirectly by the people and hold their positions based on the criteria mentioned, the government can be considered a republic. In every U.S. state, some government officials are indirectly appointed by the people, aligning with this definition of a republic. In most states, even the highest official is indirectly appointed.. In one state, this indirect appointment even extends to the legislative branch. All state constitutions specify term lengths for high offices, often spanning years. In most state constitutions, judges hold their positions based on good conduct.
OriginalIf we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT for such a government that the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. According to the constitution of every State in the Union, some or other of the officers of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good behavior.
The proposed constitution aligns closely with the republican principles we have defined. The House of Representatives is directly elected by the people, similar to at least one chamber in all state legislatures. The Senate is indirectly elected, similar to the current Congress and Maryland’s Senate, meeting the republican criterion of indirect appointment. The President is also indirectly elected, aligning with the practice in most states. Even the judges and other officers are indirectly chosen by the people, similar to the state-level practice. The term lengths for federal offices align with republican principles and state practices. The House has two-year terms, similar to South Carolina’s practice. The Senate has six-year terms, which is close to the term lengths in Maryland, New York, and Virginia. The President serves a four-year term, which is comparable to the chief magistrates in New York, Delaware, and South Carolina (in other states, the chief magistrate is elected annually). Some states, however, lack provisions for impeaching their chief executive, and in Delaware and Virginia, the chief executive can only be impeached after leaving office. In this Constitution, the U.S. President can be impeached at any time while in office. Federal judges hold their positions based on good behavior, aligning with republican principles. Other federal offices will have their tenures defined by law, in line with state practices and reason.
OriginalOn comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate, like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard, and to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office. The President of the United States is impeachable at any time during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the example of the State constitutions.
The proposed Constitution explicitly bans titles of nobility at both federal and state levels, reinforcing its commitment to republican principles that oppose hereditary privilege. It also explicitly guarantees that each state must maintain a republican form of government, further emphasizing its adherence to republican ideals.
OriginalCould any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.
Critics argue that adhering to a republican form of government is not enough; the convention should have also maintained the federal structure of the union, regarded as a confederations of states rather than a consolidation into a single entity. Critics further question the legitimacy of such a significant change, asking what authority the convention had to make this shift from a federal to a national system. This objection has been used as a significant point of criticism and therefore warrants a detailed examination.
Original"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection requires that it should be examined with some precision.
Before delving into the validity of the objection itself, it’s crucial to first understand the actual nature of the proposed government. Secondly, we must examine the extent to which the convention had the authority to propose this kind of government. Lastly, we must consider whether the convention’s duty to the well-being of the country could make up for any lack of formal authority they might have had.
OriginalWithout inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular authority.
To determine the true nature of the government, it is necessary to look at how it was created, the source of its powers, how those powers work, the extent of those powers, and what authority is allowed to make changes to the government.
OriginalFirst. In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced.
One aspect of the new constitution is that it will be based on the approval and formal ratification of the American people. This approval will be given through representatives who are specifically elected to decide on the Constitution. This approval will not come from the American people as a single, unified entity. Instead, the approval will come from people as members of their individual states. The act, therefore of establishing the constitution will not be a national act, but a federal one.
OriginalOn examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.
The act of establishing the Constitution will be a federal act because the approval for the constitution will not come from a simple majority of all people in the union or from a majority of the states, it must instead be unanimously approved by all states involved. This approval is unique because it comes directly from the people, not from the legislative bodies of the states. If the Constitution were considered a national act, then the majority of people in the entire country would have the power to bind the minority. This majority could be determined either by counting individual votes or by considering the majority of states, but neither of these rules has been adopted. Each state is considered a separate, sovereign entity that voluntarily chooses whether or not to approve the Constitution. Given these considerations, the new Constitution should be viewed as a federal document, not a national one.
OriginalThat it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.
The next point of discussion is about where the government derives its powers. The House of Representatives will get its authority directly from the people, similar to how state legislatures are formed. It represents a national aspect of the government, not a federal one. The Senate, however, will get its authority from the states, and each state will have equal representation, making this a federal feature. The executive branch, or the presidency, will have a complex origin for its authority: the states, acting as individual political entities, will have a role in the immediate election of the president. The voting power of the states in the presidential election is complex, recognizing them both as independent entities and as parts of a larger whole. The final decision in the presidential election will be made by the House of Representatives, but in this act, they represent individual states, not the nation as a whole. The government, as proposed, has a balanced mix of both federal and national elements.
OriginalThe next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary powers of government are to be derived. The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.
Critics outline that in a federal system, the government’s powers act on states as political entities, while in a national system, the powers act directly on individual citizens. When evaluated based on this criterion, the proposed constitution leans more towards a national character rather than a federal one, although not entirely. There are specific instances, such as legal disputes involving states, where states are treated as collective political entities, which is a federal feature. However, in most routine and essential functions, the government will operate on individuals, making it, in the eyes of its critics, more of a national government.
OriginalThe difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.
If the government appears national in how it operates, it takes on a different character when considering the scope of its powers. A truly national government would have not just authority over individuals but also unlimited power over all matters within its jurisdiction. In a unified nation, this ultimate authority resides entirely in the national legislative body. n a federation, the authority is divided between the central government and the local or state governments. In a national system, local governments are entirely subordinate to the central authority, while in a federal system, local governments maintain a level of sovereignty and are not completely subject to the central authority. The proposed U.S. government is not purely national because it has limited, enumerated powers, while states retain sovereignty in other areas. It is true that when their are conflicts between the two jurisdictions, the federal courts will ultimately decide, but this does not alter the fundamental nature of the government’s structure. Decisions about jurisdiction will be made impartially, following constitutional guidelines. Such a tribunal is necessary to prevent conflict and because it makes more sense for this body to be part of the federal government rather than local governments.
OriginalBut if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.
When examining how amendments are made to the Constitution, it becomes clear that the system is neither entirely national nor entirely federal. If the system were purely national, the majority of the people in the union would have the ultimate authority to change or even abolish the government at any time. Conversely, if it were purely federal, every state would have to agree to any changes for those changes to be binding on the entire union. The actual method for amending the Constitution, as laid out by the framers, doesn’t strictly adhere to either the wholly national or wholly federal principles. The amendment process requires more than a simple majority and considers states rather than individual citizens, which makes it more federal in nature. However, because not all states have to agree for an amendment to pass, this aspect of the process is more national in nature.
OriginalIf we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.
Even when evaluated by the criteria set by its critics, the Constitution is neither purely national nor purely federal, but a mix of both. The Constitution’s foundational principles are federal in nature, as it is based on the agreement of individual states rather than a single national entity. In the legitimacy of the sources of its powers, it is partly federal and partly national. In the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; but in the extent of them, it is federal, not national. Lastly, the process for amending the Constitution is a blend of federal and national elements.
OriginalThe proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. PUBLIUS
Federalist 40
The second point to discuss is if the Convention was authorized to create and offer this mixed Constitution.
OriginalTHE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution.
The authority of the Constitutional Convention should be precisely defined by looking at the mandates or commissions given to its delegates by their respective states. all the commissions given to the delegates referred to one of two key recommendations: one from the Annapolis meeting in 1786 and the other from Congress in 1787. Examining these two recommendations is enough to understand the scope of the Constitutional Convention’s authority.
OriginalThe powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts.
The Annapolis meeting suggests that commissioners should be appointed to evaluate the state of the U.S. and to come up with additional provisions to make the federal government more effective. These provisions should then be reported to Congress and, if approved by Congress, should be ratified by each state’s legislature to become effective.
OriginalThe act from Annapolis recommends the "appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same."
Congress says that the Articles of Confederation allows for changes to be made with the approval of both the U.S. Congress and the legislatures of the individual states. Experience has shown there are flaws in the existing Articles of Confederation, and to address these flaws, several states, notably New York, have explicitly instructed their delegates in Congress to propose a convention. Holding a convention seems to be the most likely way to establish a strong national government across the states.
OriginalThe recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following: "WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:
Congress has resolved that it would be advisable to hold a convention in Philadelphia on the second Monday of the upcoming May. The delegates for this convention would be appointed by the individual states with the express goal to revise the existing Articles of Confederation. The convention is to report any proposed changes or provisions to both the U.S. Congress and the legislatures of the individual states in order to make the federal constitution sufficient for the needs of effective governance and the unity of the states.
Original"Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION."
The first goal of the convention was to create a strong national government across the states. Second, that it should be capable of maintaining the union and meeting its needs. Third, that these goals were to be achieved either by modifying the existing Articles of Confederation, as stated by Congress, or by adding whatever provisions were deemed necessary, as suggested by the Annapolis act. Fourth, that any changes or new provisions would need to be reported back to both Congress and the individual state legislatures. These changes would then need to be approved by Congress and ratified by the states.
OriginalFrom these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter.
The authority granted to the convention can be understood by carefully comparing and interpreting the language used in the acts from Annapolis and Congress. They were to frame a national government that could meet the needs of the union and to modify the Articles of Confederation to meet these objectives.
OriginalFrom a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes.
There are two fundamental principles for interpreting legal or formal texts. These principles are based on both common sense and established legal concepts. The first states that every part of a text should be interpreted in a way that gives it meaning and contributes to a common goal or purpose. The second states that if there are conflicting parts in a text, the less important elements should yield to the more important ones. Essentially, the ultimate goal or “end” of the text should take precedence over the specific “means” or methods described to achieve that end.
OriginalThere are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means.
Suppose that the authorities given to the Constitutional Convention were in conflict with each other, that the Convention might have found it impossible to create a sufficient national government by merely amending the existing Articles of Confederation. In this case, which aspect of the conflicting mandates should be prioritized? Which is more important, the means or the ends? Let even the strictest interpreters of delegated powers and the most committed objectors against the convention answer these questions. Let them declare what is most crucial for the well-being of the American people: maintaining the Articles of Confederation or establishing a more effective government to preserve the union. Let them declare whether preserving the Articles of Confederation is an end within itself, or a means to the end.
OriginalSuppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed.
But is it necessary to think that these ideas are completely incompatible? Is it impossible to make changes to the Articles of the Confederation to create a national government that resembles the one recommended by the Convention?
OriginalBut is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in the articles of the confederation could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by the convention?
We can assume that few would object that renaming the Articles of Confederation wouldn’t be considered an overreach of the Convention’s authority. The Convention was explicitly given the authority to make changes to the Articles and to add new provisions. So thee power to rename, change, and add are all part of the authorized powers. Must we necessarily conclude that the power is being infringed if the old Articles of Confederation remain? Those who say yes should draw a line for what is authorized or unauthorized. Will they say that changes ought not have touched the substance of the Articles? But the states would never have appointed such a serious Convention unless significant changes were to be made. Will someone further object that if not the substance, than at least the principles ought to remain untouched? I ask then, what are these principles? Do they require that the states should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? Well, they are regarded so by the proposed Constitution. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures, rather than the people? One branch of the new government will be appointed this way. Do they require that the powers of government should act upon states as opposed to upon individuals? In some instances it acts upon states, in others upon individuals. Do these principles require that no taxes should be levied without state-level intervention? Well the Articles themselves allow for some direct taxation by the government (for example, the post-office). Do these principles require that the federal government’s powers be limited, with states retaining their sovereignty? Both the new and old governments limit the powers of the federal government, leaving states sovereign in matters not specifically enumerated.
OriginalNo stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States(1) are actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the general government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.
The truth is that the principles underlying the proposed Constitution are not entirely new but are rather an expansion of the principles already present in the Articles of Confederation. The problem with the Articles of Confederation is that its principles are too weak and limited, leading to criticisms about its inefficiency. These weaknesses necessitate significant changes, making the new Constitution appear as if a complete transformation of the old system.
OriginalThe truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old.
In one instance the Constitutional Convention did deviate from its specific mandate; they proposed a Constitution that could be ratified by nine states, rather than requiring unanimous approval from all states. Despite this being the most plausible objection, it is the least emphasized in the arguments against the Convention. This is probably because people recognize it would be absurd for a single state to hold the other twelve hostage—one 1/60 of the people of America could then block the will of 59/60 of the people, an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen. Since critics have largely avoided this objection, there’s no need to address it further.
OriginalIn one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation.
The third point to look into is whether the sense of duty or the urgency of the situation could justify actions that might not have been explicitly authorized.
OriginalThe THIRD point to be inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority.
The previous discussions have scrutinized the Constitutional Convention’s actions as if they had the ultimate authority to establish a new constitution. Even when held to this high standard, the actions of the Convention have stood up to scrutiny. We should remember now that the Convention’s powers were actually just advisory in nature, as intended by the states that sent delegates, and that the proposed constitution has no authority unless it is approved by the states. It’s a draft subject to ratification. Understanding the advisory nature of the Convention’s powers provides a different perspective for evaluating its actions.
OriginalIn the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the convention.
Let’s look at the ground the convention stood on. The delegates were acutely aware of the urgent situation facing the country, which had led to the Convention as a means to correct systemic flaws. The delegates were equally convinced that the changes they proposed were essential for fulfilling their mandate, and they knew the public was anxiously awaiting the outcome of their work. They had every reason to believe that enemies of the U.S., both foreign and domestic, held opposing views. They noted how quickly states had responded to Virginia’s call for amending the Articles of Confederation. The Annapolis Convention, which had a different mandate, had nonetheless successfully recommended significant changes, supported by nearly all the states. Congress had previously assumed powers beyond its mandate in less critical situations, and the public had accepted this. In times of great change, the substance of governance should take precedence over formalities, to preserve the people’s right to change their government. Given the difficulty for the entire populace to act in unison, it’s necessary for a smaller group of citizens to initiate changes. The delegates would have remembered that it was through such informal actions that the states first united against British rule, that various bodies were formed to focus efforts and defend rights, leading to the current state constitutions. Nor could it have been forgotten that who insisted on strict adherence to formalities often had ulterior motives against the changes being proposed. They would remember that the ultimate authority lay with the people, who could approve or disapprove the new constitution, and that failing to act, or proposing insufficient measures, could be as problematic as exceeding their mandate.
OriginalLet us view the ground on which the convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia), towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted, in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,"(2) since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies.
Imagine if the Constitutional Convention, instead of acting boldly to propose a new system, chose to disappoint the public by sticking rigidly to existing forms and delaying action. How would anyone with a sense of patriotism or virtue consider the world’s judgment on such a timid and ineffective assembly? For those men who cannot help but condemn, let me then ask what judgment they would levy on the twelve states that sent delegates to an unauthorized convention, or upon Congress which recommended this unauthorized assembly, or upon New York in particular which initially pushed for the convention and then participated in it, despite its unauthorized nature?
OriginalHad the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition?
For the sake of argument, consider if the Constitutional Convention was neither formally authorized nor justified by the situation to propose a new constitution: does it then follow that the Constitution ought to be rejected for that reason alone? If it’s considered wise to accept good advice even from enemies, would we be foolish enough to reject good advice when it comes from friends? The focus should be on the quality of the advice (i.e. the Constitution), rather than the source of it.
OriginalBut that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice be GOOD.
In summary, the main accusation against the Constitutional Convention—that it exceeded its powers—is largely unfounded, except for one minor point that critics don’t emphasize much. Even if the convention had exceeded its formal powers, the circumstances warranted such action. They were obligated to act in the best interests of the nation. And finally, even if the convention had overstepped both its powers and obligations, the proposed constitution should still be accepted if it serves the well-being and aspirations of the American people. The key question moving forward is whether the proposed constitution actually meets the criteria of serving the well-being and aspirations of the American people.
OriginalThe sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assume; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation. PUBLIUS 1. Connecticut and Rhode Island. 2. Declaration of Independence.