A Discussion of the Supposed Danger From the Union Over the State Governments
by James Madison
Federalist 45
After demonstrating that each power transferred to the federal government is necessary and proper, we must now consider if the collective powers given to the federal government pose a threat to the authority that remains with the states.
OriginalHAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.
Critics of the Constitution have focused more on the potential impact of these powers on state governments than on what powers are truly necessary for the federal government. However, if we agree that the union is crucial for protecting Americans from foreign threats, preventing conflicts between states, and safeguarding against oppressive factions and military overreach, then the importance of the union is clear. If the union is essential for the people’s happiness, it doesn’t make sense to oppose a federal government that is necessary to achieve these goals, just because it might reduce the states’ powers. The American Revolution and the formation of the Confederacy were not about empowering state governments, but about ensuring peace, liberty, and safety for the people. We remember the old notion that people exist for the benefit of kings, not the other way around. We must not adopt a similar view in America, where the well-being of the people is sacrificed for the sake of state governments. The primary goal is always the public good and the happiness of the people. Any government’s value comes from how well it achieves this goal. If the proposed Constitution or even the union itself were harmful to public happiness, they should be rejected or abolished. Similarly, if state sovereignty conflicts with the people’s happiness, it should be the sovereignty that is sacrificed. We’ve already discussed the necessity of this sacrifice. Now we need to examine how much of the remaining state authority is actually at risk under the proposed federal government.
OriginalThe adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the security of the people of America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us.
In these papers, we’ve discussed several key points that suggest the federal government’s actions are unlikely to gradually destroy state governments. The more I think about this topic, the more convinced I become that the balance of power is actually more at risk of being upset by the dominance of state governments than by the federal government.
OriginalSeveral important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.
In examining both ancient and modern confederacies, we often see a pattern where member states try to weaken the central government’s authority, while the central government struggles to defend itself against these challenges. Although these historical examples are quite different from the system proposed in the U.S. Constitution, they still offer lessons because the states under the Constitution will retain significant powers. For instance, the Achaean League and the Lycian Confederacy, two ancient federations, had structures somewhat similar to the one proposed by the Constitutional Convention. Yet, history doesn’t show these leagues becoming centralized governments. Instead, their downfall came from the central authority’s inability to manage disagreements and prevent the breakup of the member states. These examples are especially relevant because they faced more external pressures to stay united than the United States, suggesting that even weaker internal bonds might be enough to maintain unity in the U.S.
OriginalWe have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other.
The feudal system in Europe also showed a tendency for local rulers to overpower the central authority. Despite sometimes lacking the people’s support, local rulers often gained more power than the king or central government. If it weren’t for external threats that required a united front and, in cases where local rulers had the people’s support, Europe’s major kingdoms might now be as fragmented as they were during the feudal era when each baron was virtually independent.
OriginalIn the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.
The state governments hold several advantages over the federal government, which include their more direct relationship with the people, greater personal influence, the specific powers they have, the likelihood of public support, and their ability to resist and challenge federal actions.
OriginalThe State governments will have the advantage of the Federal government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other.
State governments are integral to the federal system, but the federal government is not essential for state governments to function. For example, without state legislatures, the President of the United States can’t be elected. State legislatures play a major role in choosing the President and have total control over electing the Senate. Even the House of Representatives, though directly elected by the people, is significantly influenced by those who are elected to state legislatures. Therefore, the main branches of the federal government owe their existence to the state governments to some degree, making them more likely to be deferential to the states rather than domineering. In contrast, the components of state governments don’t owe their positions to the federal government or its members. This independence from federal influence strengthens the position of state governments relative to the federal government.
OriginalThe State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.
The number of people working under the U.S. Constitution will be much smaller than those employed by individual states. This means the federal government will have less personal influence compared to the states. Consider the legislative, executive, and judicial employees across thirteen states (and more as the nation grows), including local justices of the peace, militia officers, and various local officials for a population of over three million. These state employees, who are closely connected with all segments of the population, far outnumber and have more influence than those working for the federal government. When you compare the employees of the three main branches of government in the thirteen states to those in the corresponding federal branches, or compare state militia officers to federal military personnel, the states clearly have the upper hand in terms of numbers and influence. Even if the federal government employs tax collectors, state governments will have many more, spread across the country. Federal tax collectors will likely be fewer and concentrated mainly on the coast. Though the federal government can collect both internal and external taxes, it’s expected that this power will be used mainly for additional revenue needs. States might be given the option to collect their contributions first, and federal collections would probably be done through state-appointed officers following state rules. In many cases, such as in the judiciary, state officers might also serve as federal officers. Even if the federal government employs its own internal revenue collectors, their influence would be minor compared to the multitude of state officers. In any area with a federal collector, there would be many more state officers, often influential people, whose loyalty lies with the state.
OriginalThe number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members of the corresponding departments of the single government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. Within every district to which a federal collector would be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers of different descriptions, and many of them persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State.
The proposed Constitution gives the federal government limited and specific powers. These powers mainly involve dealing with other countries, like matters of war, peace, negotiations, and international trade. Taxation is mostly related to these areas too. On the other hand, state governments will hold a broader and less defined set of powers. These will cover issues that directly affect people’s daily lives, freedoms, and property, as well as the internal management, development, and well-being of each state.
OriginalThe powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
In times of war and crisis, the federal government will play a bigger and more crucial role. However, during peacetime and stability, state governments will have a more significant part. Since peace is more common than war, state governments will generally have more influence than the federal government. The stronger and more capable the federal government is in defending the nation, the less often dangerous situations will arise that could increase the power of the federal government over the state governments.
OriginalThe operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the particular States.
When examined carefully and fairly, it’s clear that the main change proposed by the new Constitution is not so much the addition of new powers to the federal government, but rather strengthening its existing powers. True, regulating commerce is a new power, but this is generally accepted and not seen as problematic. The powers related to war, peace, armies, navies, treaties, and finances, along with other major powers, are already given to Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The new Constitution doesn’t increase these powers but simply makes them more effective. The change in taxation is perhaps the most significant. However, the current Congress can already ask states for unlimited funds for national defense and general welfare. The new Congress will have the same power but will ask individuals instead of states. If the states had followed the Articles of Confederation strictly, or if their compliance could have been ensured as easily as with individuals, our past experiences don’t suggest that state governments would lose their powers or become completely merged into a single national government. To claim that consolidation would have followed is the same as saying that state governments cannot exist alongside any system at all that accomplishes the essential purposes of the union.
OriginalIf the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress by the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important; and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that the State governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence of the State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union. PUBLIUS
Federalist 46
The topic we’re continuing is this: which will have more of the people’s favor and support, the federal government or the state governments?
OriginalRESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people.
Despite their different methods of being chosen, we must view both the federal and state governments as essentially dependent on the citizens of the United States. I’m stating this now for the federal government, with evidence to be provided later. Both the federal and state governments are agents for the people, created with distinct powers for specific purposes. Critics of the Constitution seem to forget about the people when discussing this matter. They see these two levels of government as competitors and enemies, acting independently without any higher authority controlling their struggle for power. These critics need to be corrected. They should be reminded that the ultimate power lies with the people alone. The expansion of either the federal or state governments’ power will not just depend on their own ambitions or strategies. It should be considered that every outcome depends on the will and approval of the citizens.
OriginalNotwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents.
In addition to previous arguments, it seems clear that people will naturally feel more connected to their state governments. More individuals expect to be involved in state administration and benefit from state-provided positions and rewards. State governments take care of local and personal matters for the people. The public is more familiar with state affairs and has closer personal, familial, and political relationships with state government members. Therefore, it’s reasonable to expect that people will be more inclined to favor and support their state governments.
OriginalMany considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.
Experience shows that even when the federal administration was very active and important, such as during the war and when paper money was still trusted, people’s attention and loyalty still went back to their state governments. The early enthusiasm for the federal Congress faded, and people focused more on their own state governments. The federal government was never the favorite of the public. Those who wanted to gain political influence usually did so by opposing any increase in the federal government’s power and importance.
OriginalExperience speaks the same language in this case. The federal administration, though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever. It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens.
If people start to favor the federal government over state governments in the future, it would only be because the federal government clearly shows it can govern better. This change in preference would be based on strong evidence of better administration at the federal level. If this happens, it’s only fair for people to place their trust where it’s most deserved. Even then, state governments don’t have much to worry about. The federal government is only effective within a certain range of issues; beyond that, it’s not suited to manage things as well as state governments can.
OriginalIf, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.
The next topics I will discuss to compare the federal and state governments are their ability and inclination to oppose and interfere with each other’s actions.
OriginalThe remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other.
It has already been shown that members of the federal government will depend more on state governments than the other way around. The people, who both governments rely on, tend to favor state governments more. Therefore, in terms of their attitudes towards each other, state governments have an advantage. Additionally, members of the federal government are likely to have a bias in favor of states, while it’s rare for state government members to favor the federal government. Members of Congress will probably care more about local issues, similar to how state legislatures often prioritize local interests over the state’s overall well-being. This local focus in state legislatures often leads to decisions that don’t necessarily benefit the whole state. If they struggle to consider their state’s overall welfare, it’s unlikely they will prioritize the nation’s overall prosperity and the federal government’s status. Conversely, federal legislators might overly focus on local matters. Decisions in Congress are often more influenced by state interests rather than national well-being. Historical records and admissions from those who’ve been in Congress show that its members often act more as representatives of their states than as impartial guardians of national interests. However, this doesn’t mean the new federal government won’t have broader policies than existing state governments; it’s just that it will be influenced by both local and national perspectives and unlikely to infringe on state rights or powers. State governments won’t have the same incentive to expand their power at the federal government’s expense.
OriginalIt has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members.
Even if the federal government wanted to extend its power beyond its proper limits just like state governments might, states would still be better at stopping such overreach. If a state does something that goes against the national government but is popular within that state and doesn’t blatantly break the state officers’ oaths, it will be quickly put into action with local resources. Any opposition from the federal government or interference by federal officers would only make people in the state more passionate about their position, and fixing this issue would be hard and undesirable. On the other hand, if the federal government does something unwarranted (or even warranted but unpopular) in certain states, resisting it would be easy and effective. The people’s dissatisfaction, reluctance to help federal officers, disapproval from the state’s leaders, and hurdles created by state laws would create significant challenges. These challenges would be considerable in a large state and even more so if several neighboring states shared the same opinion, presenting great obstructions that the federal government would hardly be willing to deal with.
OriginalWere it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.
If the federal government tries to overstep its authority and take power from the state governments, it wouldn’t just face opposition from one or a few states. Such actions would cause widespread concern among all states. Governments would unite, communicating and planning how to resist. This united response would be driven by the same spirit that opposed foreign control. If the federal government didn’t back down, this could lead to a conflict similar to the one against a foreign power. However, it’s almost unthinkable that the federal government would go this far. In the American Revolution, one part of the British Empire fought against another. The larger part infringed on the rights of the smaller part. This was unfair and unwise, but not completely unrealistic. But in a conflict between the federal government and the states, it would be a few national representatives against representatives from thirteen states, with all the people supporting their state representatives.
OriginalBut ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter.
The last argument against state governments’ survival is the unlikely idea that the federal government might build up a military for power grabs. If the arguments in these papers are valid, it’s clear this danger isn’t real. It’s far-fetched to think that the people and states would continuously elect leaders who plan to betray them, that these leaders would consistently work to grow the military for this purpose, and that everyone would just watch this happen without objecting. This would seem to everyone more like the incoherent fears of a feverish suspicion, or the overblown claims of a fake zeal, than like the sober concerns of genuine patriotism. But let’s entertain this extreme idea and say the federal government did create a large army loyal only to it. Even then, state governments, with the people’s support, could still fend off such a threat. The largest possible standing army in the U.S. would be tiny compared to the militia, which would consist of hundreds of thousands of citizens with their own arms, led by officers they trust, fighting for their shared freedoms. It’s doubtful that such a militia could be defeated by a regular army. This is especially true given America’s history of resisting British forces. Americans have the unique advantage of being armed, unlike people in many other nations, and they have state governments they are loyal to. These governments appoint militia officers, creating a defense against ambitious power grabs that a centralized government can’t match. In Europe, despite large military forces, governments fear arming their people. If Europeans had arms and local governments like in America, their tyrannies would likely be quickly overthrown. It’s insulting to think that Americans, who have and cherish their freedoms, would be less capable of defending them than Europeans would be of gaining theirs. It’s even more insulting to suggest that Americans would allow themselves to be put in such a position by not resisting a series of sneaky steps leading to this scenario.
OriginalThe only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it.
The argument about the federal government’s relationship with the people can be summarized simply and decisively. The federal government will either be dependent on the people or it will not. If it is dependent on the people, this reliance will prevent it from creating plans that go against the wishes of the citizens. If it is not dependent on the people, it won’t have their trust, and any attempts it makes to overstep its power will be easily stopped by the state governments, which will have the people’s support.
OriginalThe argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people.
After reviewing the points made in this and the previous paper, it becomes clear that the powers given to the federal government are not threatening to the powers kept by the individual states. These federal powers are absolutely necessary to achieve the goals of the union. Therefore, all the worries about the federal government intentionally destroying state governments are, at best, based on unrealistic fears of those who raise such concerns.
OriginalOn summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them. PUBLIUS
